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"The Greatest Dissemblers in the World":
Timucuas, Spaniards, and the Fall of Fort
Caroline
by Christophe J.M. Boucher
t dawn, September 20, 1565, four hundred Spanish soldiers
under the command of the Adelantado (military governor)
Pedro Menendez de Aviles launched a surprise attack on
Fort Caroline, a French outpost located in the lower reaches of
what is today the St. Johns River in northern Florida. The assault
could not have come at a worse time for the fort's residents. Ten
days earlier, most of the fighting men in the settlement had sailed
south to St. Augustine with Jean Ribault to launch a preemptive
strike against Menendez, who had just landed in the area. What
could have been a resounding victory for the French evaporated
when a hurricane dispersed and damaged their fleet within sight
of their enemies' makeshift fortifications.
Bolstered by this miraculous turn of events, Menendez had
hastily put a striking force together and led his grumbling men on a
three-day march across a forbidding terrain in pouring rain. Upon
arrival, La Caroline was ripe for the picking, since, as a French eyewitness recalled: "there were only about 20 fit enough to serve ....
The others in the fort were either servants or mechanics, who
had never heard a gun fired, king's commissaries, who were more
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used to handling pens than swords, or women." 1 The attack was
so unexpected that, within an hour, the Spaniards were masters of
the fort. 2 It was a lopsided victory. While Menendez reported only
one soldier lightly wounded in the operation, 132 French colonists
were dead. 3 Fifty to sixty residents, including Rene de Laudonniere, the commanding officer, managed to escape the carnage by
slipping into the woods, while others sought refuge on ships nearby.4 In the following weeks, the death toll rose when the Spaniards
captured and swiftly executed several hundred individuals, including Ribault, who was stranded close to St. Augustine during the
hurricane. 5
The startling loss of La Caroline and the violent demise of its
residents sparked an outrage throughout the French Protestant
community, since mostoftl1e victims were co-religionists. The publication of the survivors' chilling accounts insured that memories
of that fateful day would live on and fan anti-Spanish sentiments

2

3

4
5

Paul Hulton, ed., 171e Works ofJacques l.Ai Mayne de Morgues: A Huguenot Artist in France, Florida, and England v. l (London: British Museum Publications,
Limited, 1977), 133. For other descriptions of the contingent left in the fort,
see Suzanne Lussagnet, ed., Les Franrais en Amerique pendant la deuxieme rnoitie
du XV/' siiclev. 2: Les Franrais en Floride (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1958), 178,216.
Francisco Lopez De Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria de! buen suc;:esso y buen
Viaje que dios nuestro senor fue servido de dar a Ia armada que salio de la
i;:uidad de cadiz para Ia prouini;:ia y costa de La Florida ... ," 1565, Patronato
19, R.17, Arch.ivo General de lndias, 17. http:/ /pares.mcu.es/ParesBusquedas/servlets/ImageServlet?accion=4l&txt_id_imagen=8&txt_rotar=0&txt_
contraste=0&txt_zoom=l0&appOrigen=&cabecera=N (accessed July 6, 2018).
Eugenio Ruidiaz, ed., "Carta de! Adelantado Pedro Menendez de Aviles, al
Rey, fecha en La Florida, Ribera de San Pelayo, fuerte de San Augustin, 15 de
Octubre de 1565 ... ," La Flarida; su conquista y colonizacion por Pedro Menendez de
Aviles, v. 2 (Madrid: Garcia, 1894), 86. Mendoza Grajales states, however, that
142 died in the attack ("Memoria de! buen sU(;:esso," 17), a discrepancy that
Menendez elucidates by noting that the Spaniards killed 10 additional escapees the day after the attack (Ruidiaz, La Florida, 86). The assailants only spared
the female residents and children under age 15, some 50 to 70 depending on
the source (Ruidiaz, La Florida, 87 and Gonzalo Solis de Merasss, 'The Conquest of Florida by the Adelantado Pedro Melendez de Valdes," in Pedro Menendez de Aviles and the Conquest of Florida: A New Manuscript, ed. David Arbesu
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2016), 57.
Ruidfaz, La Flarida, 86. See also Solfs de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 57
and Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria de! buen sui;:esso," 17.
A variety of primary sources describes these episodes. See, for instance, Ruidiaz, ed., La Florida, v. 2, 87-89 and 101-104; Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria de!
buen sui;:esso," 19-22; Solis de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 64-73. For
a French perspective, see Nicolas Le Challeux, "Discours de l'histoire de la
Floride" in Lussagnet, Les Fran,ais en Arnerique, 227-233 and Hulton, The Works
ofJacques Le Mayne de Morgues, 13&-138.
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for decades to come. In May 1566, for instance, less than six
months after his return to France, Nicolas Le Challeux published
his Discours de l'histoire de la Floride, an autobiographical pamphlet
describing the author's ordeal overseas. 6 With his quill, the Protestant carpenter from Dieppe eviscerated Menendez and his men,
describing in vivid details the atrocities they had committed on the
defenseless residents. In their fury, they had, he thundered, "vied
with one another to cut the throats of men, healthy and sick alike,
women, and little children ... " and had gone as far as desecrating the dead. 7 His work found such an avid audience that it was
reproduced four times that same year. 8 The religious and political motivations of eye-witnesses such as Le Challeux contributed
to the distortion of the historical narrative by framing the events
in the larger context of Franco-Spanish rivalries in Europe during
the Wars of Religion.
The historian Jonathan DeCoster has shown, that this tendency to frame the episode in the context of this European conflict,
has served, then and now, to obscure the significant role Native
Americans played in the dispute that pitted the French and Spanish crowns in their bid for La Florida. 9 This issue is particularly
noticeable in tl1e fall of La Caroline. While scholars such as Eugene
Lyon, Paul E. Hoffman, and John T. McGrath have aptly described
the series of events that culminated with the destruction of the
Huguenot outpost, their analyses of this gruesome episode have
once again given center stage to the European actors involved. io
The entire text is available in Lussagnet, Les Fran,ais en Amerique, 201-233.
LussagneL, Les Franrais en Ameriqu.e, 216 and 221. I have translated all the
quotes extracted from this work. For a full English translation of Le Challeux's
account, see Stefan Lorant, ed., The New World: The First Pictures ofAmerica Made
Ir; john White and Jacques Le Mrryne and Engraved Ir; Theodore de Bry, Rev. Ed. (New
York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1965), 100.
8
John T. McGraLh, The French in Early Florida: In the Eye of the Hurricane (Gainesville: The University Press of Florida, 2000), 183-184, 218 and by the same
author, "A Massacre Revised: Mantanzas, 1565," Proceedings of the Meetings of the
French Colonial Historical Society (1997), 23.
9 Jonathan DeCoster, "Entangled Borderland: Ew·opeans and Timucuans in
Sixteenth-Century Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly 91, nG.3 (Winter 2013),
376-377.
10 Eugene Lyon, The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro Menendez de Aviles and the Spanish
Conquest 1565-1568 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976), 119-122;
Paul Hoffman, A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast
during the Sixteenth Century (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State U niversity Press, 1990), 229-231 and Florida Frontier (Bloomington and lndjanapolis:
Indiana University Press, 2002), 48-50; McGrath, The French in Early Florida,
142-146.
6

7
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TI1is outcome is understandable. In their scrupulous analyses of
the primary sources, Lyon, Hoffman, and McGrath have conveyed
the impression emanating from the evidence that the Timucuas played at best a supporting role. Laudonniere's account, for
example, made hardly any mention of the indigenous involvement
in the storming of the fort. Besides a brief reference to information he obtained from "King Emola" concerning the fact that the
Spaniards were "digging in" just south of the French outpost, the
Timucuas, on whose land the Europeans were fighting, were conspicuously absent. 11 Just like Le Challeux, however, Laudonniere
focused on the role the Spaniards played in the affair which ended
up artificially amplifying the voices of the European actors while
drastically attenuating those of the Timucuas. Taking his cue from
historians such as Kathleen DuVal, DeCoster re-established parity
in the narrative by framing the French-Spanish rivalry in La Florida
from 1562 to 1568 in the context of pre-existing intra-Timucuan
conflicts, an approach that restored indigenous agency. 12 In fact,
his article showed that "longstanding rivalries [between indigenous
polities] led the Timucuans to recruit the French newcomers as
allies in their intra-native conflicts at nearly every opportunity." 13 In
the process, DeCoster, like John H. Hann before him, provided a
very succinct overview of the Timucua contribution to the Spanish
capture of Fort Caroline. 14 The significance of this event in colonial
American history warrants, at long last, to take a much closer look
at the indigenous involvement in this defining moment. 15 A close
reading of French and especially Spanish eye-witness accounts
11
12
13
14
15

Lussagnet, Les Franrais en Amfmque, 175.
Kathleen Duval, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
DeCoster, "Entangled Borderland," 379.
John H. Hann, A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996) , 48-49.
This paper's focus on the political relations between the Timucuas and European settlers should not obscure the fact that scholars have also studied other
aspects of this encounter in 16"'-century Florida. See for instance, Laura Fishman, "Old World Images Encounter New World Reality: Rene Laudonniere
and the Timucuans of Florida," The Sixteenth Century journal 26, no. 3 (Autumn
1995): 547-559; Daniel Murphree, "Gendering the Borderlands: Conquistadores, Women, and Colonialism in Sixteenth-Century Florida," The Sixteenth
Century Journal 43, no. l (Spring 2012): 47-69; Heather E. Martel, "Timucua
in Deer Clothing: Friendship, Resistance and Protestant Identity in Sixteentl1Cenn1ry Florida," Atlantic Studies 10, no. I (2013): 13-33; Martel, "Colonial Allure: Normal Homoeroticism and Sodomy in French and Timucuan
Encounters in Sixteenth-Century Florida," Journal of the History of Sexuality 22,
no.I (January 2013): 34-64.
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provides bits of evidence, which, once woven together, indicates
that, far from being passive observers, the Timucuas played a critical role in this episode even though they mostly operated behind
the scenes. As such, they lived up to the accusations of two Spanish castaways whom Laudonniere had rescued some time earlier
that they were "the greatest dissemblers in the world." 16 As will be
shown, Menendez could not have chosen a better time to oust the
Protestant interlopers from the region. After months of progressive deterioration, diplomatic relations between the Huguenot
expatriates and their Timucua neighbors had reached an all-time
low. Menendez's timely arrival gave the locals an opportunity to
settle the score with the disruptive settlers. While Spanish soldiers
clearly administered the coup de grace, this daring operation could
not have succeeded, let alone been undertaken, had the Timucuas
not provided the Spaniards with the logistical support, geographic
knowledge, and critical intelligence that were indispensable to nip
this French colonial enterprise in the bud.
On September 8, 1565, the same day Ribault began preparations in La Caroline to strike the Spaniards who had landed just
thirty miles to the south, Menendez officially took possession of the
region in Philip II's name. 17 The newcomers established their base
of operation in Seloy, a Timucua village situated close to today's
Matanzas River. 18 As was typical, this settlement might have numbered between twenty and thirty houses for a total population of
200. 19 It was one of a multitude of linguistically and culturally related villages that dotted a vast area extending along the Atlantic from
Cape Canaveral to the Altamaha River and stretching deep inland
in present-day southern Georgia and northern Florida. 20 Two
hundred thousand people might have lived in the region at the
time of contact. 21 Villages such as Seloy were headed by chiefs who
16

lbid.,134. See also p. 131 for more information about these two Spanish
survivors.
17 Ruidfaz, La Florida, v.2 , 78.
18 Lussagnet, Les Fran,ais en Amerique, 173. David Arbesu claims that St. Augustine was located "8 leagues north of Canaveral." In Pedro Menendez de Aviles and
the Conquest ofFlorida, 387, note 32
19 John T. Milanich, The Timucua (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 130-131.
20 Jerald T. Milanich, "The Timucua Indians of Northern Florida and Southern
Georgia," in 771e Indians of the Greater Southeast, ed. Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 2.
21 John T. Milanich, "Ticnucua," Handbook of North American Indians, Southeast, v.
14, ed. Raymond Fogelson (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2004),
219.
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gained their power through hereditary title. 22 They maintained
their status in a social order made up of "aristocrats" and commoners thanks to a variety of strategies. 23 Among other things, chiefs
held exclusive ritual prerogatives in the community; they possessed
specialized esoteric power that set them apart from fellow residents. They also controlled the circulation of exotic goods in a giftexchange economy designed to prop up the alliance networks that
insured their political longevity. 24 At the time of contact, simple
chiefdoms such as Seloy were combined in larger socio-political
conglomerates that vied with each other despite their linguistic
and cultural similarities. La Caroline stood on a territory headed
by Saturiwa; Laudonniere claimed that his host ruled some thirty
tributary chiefs. 25 Further upriver lived his arch-enemy, Utina, who
oversaw over forty leaders. 26 To the west of the latter's domain
were other powerful Timucua chiefs such as Potano, Onatheaqua,
and Houstaqua. 27 In all, Timucua country was divided into at least
fifteen such geo-political "provinces," as the Spaniards later called
them. 28 While the sources are too scant for scholars to provide a
definite answer, an oblique reading of the documentary evidence
suggests that the village of Seloy was at least on friendly terms with
Saturiwa. 29
22

John E. Worth, The Timucua Chiefdoms of Spanish Florida, v. 1 (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1998), 5. The first chapter of this book provides
a useful description of Timucuan chiefdoms from a historical, cultural and
structural standpoint. As Robin Beck points out, the term "chiefdom" has
become controversial and I share his views on the subject. In Chiefdom, Collapse,
and Coal£scence in the Early American South (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), especially 27-30.
23 Hann, A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 25.
24 Timothy Earle, "The Evolution of Chiefdoms," Current Anthropology, 30, no.l
(February 1989), 86; Hann, A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 74,
115; Hulton, The Works ofJacques Le Mayne de Morgues, v.2, Plate 127; Randolph
J. Widmer, "The Structure of Southeastern Chiefdoms," in ThP Forgot/en Centuries: Indians and Europeans in the American South, 1521-1704, ed. Charles Hudson
and Carmen Chaves Tesser (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 137140; Worth, The Timucuan Chiefdo ms of Spanish Flmida, v. l, 11.
25 Lussagnet, Les Franrais en Amerique, 97.
26 Ibid., 102. For a list of the communities associated with each alliance network,
see Haan, A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 81.
27 Lussagnet, Les Fran,ai.s en Amiirique, 102.
28 Hann, A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 5.
29 For instance, Hann, A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 81; John W.
Griffin "The Men Who Met Menendez 8000 B.C. - 1565 A.D.," in The Oldest
City: St. Augustine, Saga of Survival, ed. Jean Parker Waterbury (St. Augustine:
St. Augustine Historical Society, 1997), 1, 8 include Seloy in Saturiwa's political orbit but James W. Convington claims that they were not. See Charles M.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol97/iss2/2
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According to Menendez, the locals did not conceal their ill
will toward their Huguenot neighbors. "Many Indians were present," reported the Ade/,a,ntado, "many of them chiefs, who showed
themselves to be very friendly to us, and appear to us to be hostile to the French." 30 While Spanish eye-witness accounts do not
reveal the identity of the indigenous leaders present, it is clear
that by then Laudonniere and his fellow-colonists had earned the
general dislike of the Timucuas who had crossed their path since
the founding of La Caroline in June 1564. Relations between the
Huguenots and the locals had been set in motion two years earlier,
when Jean Ribault led two ships on a reconnaissance voyage that
surveyed the shoreline roughly from Matanza Inlet, Florida to Parris Island, South Carolina. 31 On May 1, 1562, the fleet entered the
St. Johns River. During the two days they spent in the region, Ribault and Laudonniere, who was then second in command, became
acquainted with Saturiwa and other local magnates. The encounter had been friendly but, as their stay had drawn to a close, tensions had become more palpable. Ribault then wondered if the
chief had not been slighted because the French first met with villagers located across the river from Saturiwa or because they had
erected a pillar bearing the arms of Charles IX without indigenous
consent. 32 In the end, these issues remained moot due to the
brevity of the fleet's stopover along the waterway. Laudonniere's
return to La Florida in 1564 brought French colonial ambitions
to new heights. With Ribault imprisoned in London, the Crown
instructed his former second in command to found a colony in the
region they had charted previously. Based on the warm welcome

30

31

32

Press, 2007), 22. Considering the deep animosity that existed between rival
chiefdoms (see in particular Laudonniere's observations in Lussagnet, Les
Franrais en Arnerique, 99 and 104-105), it is hard to believe that two indigenous
brothers would have been able to journey safely from Fort Caroline to Seloy
on the eve of the Spanish attack if there had not been some diplomatic ties
between Saturiwa and this Indian community to the south. See Solfs de Meras,
"The Conquest of Florida," 52.
Henry Ware, ed., "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 8 (1892-94), 2nd series, Qanuary 1894): 421. The transcription of the original statement is in Ruidiaz, La Florida, 78.
Ribault's initial landfall in 1562 is still subject to debate even though there
exists a consensus that it was in the general vicinity of Matauzas Inlet. See Jeannette T. Connor, ed., The Whole and True Discouerye of Terra Florida: A Facsimile
reprint of the London Edition of 1563, Together with a Transcript of an English V,mion
in the British Museum (Deland, FL: Flodda State Historical Society, 1927), 5 and
Bennett, ed., Three Voyages (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001),
218, note 19.
Lussagnet, Les Franrais en Arnerique, 52.

Published by STARS, 2018

7

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 97 [2018], No. 2, Art. 2
150

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

the Timucuas gave the French after this two-year hiatus, Laudonniere also had an opportunity to reset diplomatic relations with
the Indians. When the Huguenots made an initial landfall near
the future site of St. Augustine that year, a number of natives,
probably villagers from Seloy, 33 anxiously greeted the newcomers,
"shouting aloud in their own vernacular, Antipola Bonnassou, which
means brother, friend, or something similar." 34 Laudonniere also
described similar effusions of joy when, three days later, his fleet
anchored at the entrance of the St. Johns River. On this occasion,
the newcomers renewed ties with Saturiwa. The latter had been so
delighted by their arrival that "he nearly lost all his composure .... "35
The chiefs good disposition toward the French had been such that
he even assisted them in the construction of La Caroline. 36 The
"honeymoon" had been short-lived, however. A few landmark
events capture the progressive souring of diplomatic relations
between the Huguenots and their hosts.
The first noticeable tremor took place in late August 1564
when Laudonniere reneged on the pledge he had hastily made
two months earlier to assist Saturiwa in a campaign against Utina. 37
By then, the Huguenots had begun to reach out to the latter in
order to obtain the riches that abounded upriver, at least according
to local rumors. 38 Undeterred, the spurned chief proceeded with
his plan and successfully stormed an enemy settlement. 39 This victory set the stage for a more momentous diplomatic crisis between
Laudonniere and the local magnate. Shortly after Saturiwa's triumphant return, the Huguenot leader coerced by force of arms the
chief into releasing two of his captives in an effort to curry Utina's
good will. This ill-considered action became a defining moment
in the relationship between natives and newcomers. As Laudonniere rightfully concluded: Saturiwa, "greatly irritated by this act of
bravado, began to consider all the means possible to avenge himself.... "40 A simultaneous rapprochement between Laudonniere
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Ibid., 86, note 4 and 173.
Ibid., 86.
Ibid., 87.
Ibid., 98; Hulton, The Works ofJacques Le Mayne de Morgues,121.
Lussagnet, Les Franfais en Amerique, 93, 107, and 108.
Ibid., 93.
Ibid., 109.
Ibid., 111. Stephano de Rojomonte, a resident at Fort Caroline at the time, also
traced back the beginning of diplomatic tensions to August 1564. He attributed the fallout, however, to the French settlers' tendency to take food from
Indian fields without permission. Charles E. Bennett, ed., Laudonniere & Fort
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and Utina nonetheless contributed to limit the consequences for
a time. In September 1564, for instance, a handful of arquebusiers
accompanied Utina to Potano's territory where they successfully
stormed a settlement. In the following months, a number of colonists even took residence in Utina's territory.41 Yet once again, the
lure of wealth rapidly strained the rapport between the French settlers and their latest allies. In November 1564, rumors that most of
the local riches actually emanated from the "Apalatcy Mountains"
west ofUtina's domain convinced Laudonniere to open direct diplomatic channels with ChiefHostaqua who, he assumed, lived within reach of the famed region. 42 Throwing all caution to the wind in
his eagerness to find the "promised land," La Roche Ferriere, the
man entrusted with this mission, not only carried out his mandate,
he also laid the foundations for a rapprochement with Potano and
Onathaqua, all foes of Utina. 43
As Jacques Le Moyne de Morgues, a resident in La Caroline,
remarked: "By these dealings La Roche-Ferriere won the intense
ill-feeling of the Chief Outina, and especially of all his subjects
who conceived such a dislike of him that they could not even bear
to hear the sound of his name, but called him Timogua, that is,
enemy." 44 These diplomatic imbroglios came to a head in May
1565 when the supply fleet from France failed to materialize, tlms
exacerbating a food shortage that had begun a month earlier.
Understandably, Saturiwa and Utina turned a deaf ear on the settlers' plight. Offended, the desperate Huguenots responded with
forceful measures in the hope of obtaining by violence and intimidation what they could not get by peaceful means. This strategy
culminated with the capture of Utina, whom the French hoped
to ransom for food supplies. This high-handed approach set the
stage for an unprecedented crisis. On July 27, 1565, a contingent of
French colonists journeyed to Utina's territory hoping to bring the
lingering negotiations to a satisfactory end. Instead of securing the
much-needed victuals and return their captive, they clashed with

41
42
43
44

Caroline. History and Documents (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964),
95. One can wonder if Laudonniere's tour de farce did not lead his indigenous
neighbors to withhold their supplies in retaliation.
Lussagnel, Les Fraru,:ais en Amerique, 115-116.
Hulton, The Works ofJacqu.es Le Mayne de Marf!;UeS, 122 and 124. See also Lussagnet, Les Francais en Amerique, 137-138.
Hulton, The Warks ofJacques Le Mayne de Mar~s, 125.
Ibid.
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hundreds of Timucua warriors. 45 At the end of the day-long battle,
two Frenchmen lay dead and twenty-two were wounded. 46 When
the corsair John Hawkins arrived on the Stjohns River a week later,
French-Indian relations had hit rock bottom. John Sparkes, who
accompanied the English seadog, painted a bleak picture of life in
La Caroline, where the settlers, surrounded by hostile Indians, had
become virtual prisoners in their own fort. 47
Menendez, who intended to oust the Huguenots from La
Florida, could not have arrived at a more propitious time. The
Timucuas, incensed by the colonists' diplomatic slights and violent exactions, seized this opportunity to settle the score with La
Caroline. While the adelantado constantly voiced his fear that collusion between the Indians and the French could threaten his new
outpost and jeopardize his mission, the facts proved otherwise. 48
As the evidence will show, the Timucuas enabled the Spaniards to
attain a resounding victory over their enemies and alter the course
of colonial history in the Southeast.
First, the residents of Seloy offered no resistance when Menendez decided to establish his base of operation in their territory.
This was a critical tum of events for the Spaniards whose victory, if
not survival in the region, depended on a frantic race against time.
The clock had begun to tick on March 30, 1565, when Philip II had
finally learned about the existence of La Caroline. 49 Ironically, in
the days preceding this revelation, the monarch had authorized
Menendez to found a mostly self-funded colony in Santa Elena, on
present-day Parris Island, South Carolina, to preempt the colonial
ambitions of European rivals and deter interlopers from dismpting the fragile lifeline that funneled American riches to the Iberian Peninsula. 50 News of the founding of Fort Caroline prompted
the Spanish monarch to play a more active role in the operation
by endowing the adelantado with additional material and human
resources to oust the French. 51 Initially, Menendez intended to
45

46
47
48
49
50
5I

Lussagnet, Les Francais en Amh-ique, 155. See also John Sparkes, "The Voyage
Made by M. John Hawkins, Esquire, 1565," in Early English and French Voyages
Chiefly '7y Hakluyt 1534-1608, ed. Henry S. Burrage (New York: Charles Scribne1~ 1906), 123.
Lussagnet, Les Franrais en Amh-ique, 156.
Sparkes, "The Voyage Made by M.John Hawkins, Esquire, 1565," 124.
For an example ofMenendez's fear of French-Indian collusion, see Ware, "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 421. See also Ruidiaz, La Florida, 78.
Lyon, The Anterprise of Florida, 56.
Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 58, 61, 62, and 91.
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besiege the small garrison but the plan began to unravel on June 2,
1565 when Dr. Gabriel Enveja, a Spanish spy operating in Dieppe,
confinned rumors that had been circulating since March of that
year: The French had been readying a substantial fleet to reinforce
the outpost. 52 With seven ships under Ribault's command and as
many as one thousand people on board, including five hundred
well-armed soldiers, it represented a serious threat. 53 Enveja's
report that the French had embarked two hundred dismounted
cannons kindled the adelantado's worst fear. A few months earlier, Menendez had warned the king and his council in cataclysmic
terms "that if Frenchmen or Englishmen have gone to Florida ...
and made some fort in some port. .. if they be reinforced this
summer before [we can] come upon them and expel them from
the land, it will afterwards be impossible to do, due to the friendship which they will have made with the natives, because the same
natives will aid them in such a manner that only with the greatest
difficulty, even though great costs are incurred and expenditures
made, could they be expelled." 54 In the light of Enveja's report,
timing was especially critical for the success of the operation since
it now hinged on Menendez's ability to seize the Huguenot outpost
before Ribault's arrival. 55
It was not long before a series of setbacks came to hinder this
time-sensitive Spanish operation. In early July, the ships that had
left from Asturias failed to rendezvous in the Canaries with Menendez's force, which had sailed from Cadiz. Pressed for time, the
Spanish commander preferred to push on without waiting for
the stragglers, leaving orders instead for them to assemble in the
Caribbean. 56 Fate, however, proved relentless. Less than two weeks
after leaving the Near-Atlantic archipelago, a storm wreaked havoc
on Menendez's fleet, which, by then, had split into two distinct
flotillas. 57 By the time the adelantado's flagship, the San Pelayo,
limped into Puerto Rico with two broken masts and other serious
52
53
54

55
56
57

Antonine Tibesar, ed., "A Spy's Report on the Expedition of Jean Ribaut lo
Florida, 1565," The Americas 11, n. 4 (Ap1il l 955), 590-592.
Tibesar, "A Spy's Report," 590; Lyon, The Enterprise ofFlo1ida, 68.
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ed. David Hurst Thomas (New York: Garland Publishing, !rte, 1995), 74; Ruidiaz, La Florida, 321-322. See also Solfs de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 37.
McGrath, The French in Early Florida, 133; Lyon, The Enterprise ofFlorida, 91,100.
Lyon, TheEnterjniseofFlorida, 101.
Ware, "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 416-417; Ruidiaz, Florida, 70-71.
See So Ifs de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 39, Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria <lei buen su<;esso," l-2.
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damages, the enterprise was in a state of disarray. 58 Not only had
about two-third of his fleet failed to rendezvous in San Juan but
the storm had also taken its toll on the remaining ships and their
crews. 59 To make matters worse, Menendez learned that none of
the vessels, men, and supplies earmarked in the Indies to strengthen his taskforce would arrive any time soon. 60 Undeterred by these
successive setbacks and knowing the importance of having the initiative, Menendez elaborated a new plan that he described in the
following terms: "I shall not fail to land in Florida with such force
as I have with me; for, if it should be before the French anive there,
it seems to me that we shall be strong enough to take the mouth of
the harbor from them and fortify ourselves there, so as to intercept
the succor that they are looking for, for it seems to me that, to end
this war speedily, it is chiefly important that I shall arrive in Florida
before the French. "61 As Menendez saw it, such an approach would
not only prevent Ribault and Laudonniere from joining forces, it
would also give his own task force extra time to assemble and bring
adequate ground forces to capture the isolated French outpost. 62
Once again, Menendez' resolve and ability to improvise were
quickly put to the test. He finally arrived in sight of the St. Johns
River with a much-reduced strike force on the afternoon of September 4, 1565, only to discover Ribault's fleet at anchor. 63 In a
desperate attempt to salvage his mission, the Spaniards attacked
four large French ships that were too heavy to enter the waterway
safely and had remained a mile from shore. 64 Operating with skeleton crews, the enemies had decided to take flight with Menendez
in pursuit. Due to the damage he had sustained earlier, the adelantado wa.s unable to catch up with them. 65 Abandoning the chase at
dawn, he decided to revert to his earlier plan: Land the 500 soldiers
who accompanied him on an island that commanded the entrance
of the St. Johns River in order to deny the French ships access to
58
59
60

61
62
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65

Solis de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 39.
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the fort. 66 The scheme once again fell through when, drawing
close to the waterway, Menendez noticed that three additional
French ships were blocking the way and that enemy soldiers were
ready for battle on the banks. 67 By then, the prospects of ousting
the interlopers from La Florida looked grim. Not only had Menendez lost the element of surprise, but the French fleet outclassed his
in number and maneuverability. 68 The odds of a victory seemed so
thin that many Spanish officers advised postponing the enterprise
until March 1566 when the expeditionary force would be at full
complement. 69
Undeterred by this endless sequence of failures, the adelantado
opted for one last gamble. As his brother-in-law recalled: "... he
would disembark in anotl1er harbor, the closest he could find to
theirs, which he could do because tl1e vessels he had requested
were of a shallow draft. There he would fortify himself and attempt
to harm the enemy as much as possible, and to earn the trust of
the chieftains. In the spring [of 1566], with the cavalry he was to
receive from the Indies, he would be master of the field and of their
harbor." 70 This was a very bold scheme. The harbor Menendez
selected for debarkation lay a short distance from Seloy and was
just "eight leagues from the French settlement." 71 While the Spanish force was close enough to harass the Huguenots, it was also dangerously exposed to a French strike by sea, especially at this stage
of the operation. The arrival of a French reconnaissance party off
Seloy on September 8 led Menendez to anticipate that the enemy
would be back in full force within four days. This did not bode
well since, according to his estimate, over fifteen days were needed
to complete the unloading process.72 To make matters worse, his
two largest ships, including the San Pelayo, which held most of the
soldiers and supplies, did not have the draft required to clear the
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Conquest of Florida," 47.
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shallow bottom leading to the harbor. 73 This would not only slow
down the transfer of cargo, it would also make these vessels highly
vulnerable in case of an attack. 74 The unloading proceeded at a
frenetic pace until the night of September 9 when, suspecting that
an attack was imminent, Menendez decided to send his two largest
ships to Hispaniola. 75 His hunch paid off. An hour after issuing
this order, the French fleet appeared. The adelantado, who was on
board a small boat ferrying a last batch of 150 soldiers and cargo to
land, barely escaped capture. 76 At this juncture, he had managed to
disembark in-extremis the entire contingent of soldiers and settlers
along with firearms, ammunitions, and some supplies. The process
was so rushed that Father Grajales, an eye-witness, remarked: "if
tl1e French had attacked at once when tl1ey arrived, it would have
been a very great capture, because our people were not supplied
with arms and were carrying provisions." 77 In their haste, the Spaniards had to dig defensive earthworks with their bare hands for lack
of tools. 78 At this point, Menendez owed his survival to a low tide
and some sand bars that stopped the French in their tracks leaving
them exposed when a hurricane hit soon afterwards.
Considering the time-sensitive nature of this landing operation,
Menendez had good reasons to nurture the good will of the natives
as soon as he reached LaF!urida. 79 While the locals' arsenal paled in
comparison to that of the Spaniards, indigenous warriors had shown
that they could mount effective resistance to the newcomers. The
Huguenots had learned that sobering lesson first hand in late July
when they clashed with Timucua warriors in Utina's territory. Under
cover of the dense vegetation, they had developed an effective strategy to cancel out their technological lag. 80 As Laudonniere pointed
out "Their way offightingwas that when 200 had shot [their arrows],
they would fall back to make room for the others who were behind
them, and their eyes and feet were so quick that as soon as they saw
73
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75
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an arquebus aimed at them, they would promptly lie down and stand
back up to shoot, and withdraw if somehow they felt that we would
engage them in close combat: for they fear nothing more because of
daggers and swords."81 Several decades of sporadic contact between
the Spaniards and the native peoples of the Florida Peninsula had
also been highly instructive in this respect. Indian resistance had
contributed to the collapse of the expeditions headed by Juan
Ponce de Leon (1513 and 1521) and Panfilo de Narvaez (1528). It
had also taken its toll on Hernando de Soto's entrada (1539-1540)
in the region. 82 It is therefore not a surprise that, during their first
encounter with the Timucuas on September 2, Menendez and his
men feared ambush and were particularly concerned with the indigenous reception. 83 While the people of Seloy and their allies might
not have been able to push this expeditionary force back into the
sea, recourse to violence could have dangerously delayed the landing process. As it was, the operation was so rushed that, when the
French fleet appeared in the early hours of September 10, the adelantado was still ferrying no less than 150 soldiers as well as artillery,
ammunitions, and foodstuff. 84
The Natives' good disposition toward the newcomers had
another distinct advantage in the unloading effort. On September 6, during a meeting with the first contingent of Spaniards to
disembark, the chief of Seloy gave the two captains in charge a
large house located by the river bank. 85 This was a timely gift since
81
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it allowed the newcomers to store quickly goods that could be
affected by the rain without having to divert precious manpower
to complete such a project. It also provided the Spaniards with a
pre-made base of operation that could be fortified rapidly in case
Ribault decided to storm the area. "Immediately," wrote Father
Mendoza de Grajales, "Captain Patino and Captain San Vincente,
both men of talent and energy, ordered an entrenchment to be
built around this house, with a slope of earth and fascines, these
being the only means of defense possible in that country, where
stones are nowhere to be found." 86
The Timucuas also provided Menendez with critical geographic information about La Caroline. Upon arrival in La Florida, the
natives directed the Spanish fleet to the Huguenot outpost which,
in order to avoid detection, was concealed a few leagues up the
St. Johns River. 87 Until then, the adelantado had a vague idea of
the site's location, knowing only that it lay somewhere between the
28 th and 29 th degrees north latitude. 88 Even though these coordinates narrowed the search area significantly, it was still too vague
to pinpoint the enemy settlement with accuracy. As Solfs de Meras
recalled: "Since they did not know where the Lutherans had fortified themselves, they sailed for four days along the coast, very
afflicted and perplexed, not knowing whether the French were
to the north or the south."89 In the hope of obtaining additional
information, Menendez initially brought along three French captives who had lived in La Caroline and who now stood accused of
piracy in the West Indies. 90 This initiative came to naught since
the prisoners could not -or feigned not to- find the landmarks
leading to the outpost. 91 This shortcoming could not have failed to
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concern Menendez who, as we have seen, had no time to spare. The
potential crisis was averted on September 2 when some Timucuas
told the Spaniards "that the French were twenty leagues north of
there." 92 By then, Menendez had already spent almost five days
looking for La Caroline in vain, but with this information he was
able to locate the outpost in a matter of hours. 93
More importantly, during his first official meeting with the
locals on September 8, the adelantado learned from his hosts, "that,
inside this harbor, and without going to sea, we could come to the
river where the Frenchmen were, in front of their fort, by going
up the river seven or eight leagues, which would be a very good
thing, on account of being able to carry up the artillery and camp
stores and the cavalry, if we should wish to land near their fort. ...
moreover, we can go by land with horses and artillery." 94 This
information was significant for several reasons. For one, it allowed
the Spaniards to strike the French without having to sail up the
St. Johns River. Laudonniere had erected his fort at a strategic
location. Anyone sailing to La Caroline had to go past, as Menendez knew, "an island at the mouth of tl1e river about a league long
within ... so that no ship can enter or go out of that harbor, without
leave of the Alcayde who may command there." 95 As Menendez
pointed out, this route would allow the Spaniards to land by La
Caroline "without being hindered by the island, although they have
fortified it. "96 Besides this obstacle, the navigation into the St. Johns
River was also particularly treacherous because a sand bar that lay
at its entrance and prevented large vessels such as the San Pelayo
from sailing close to the fort, thus making an amphibious operation hazardous. 97
1n addition, the French, who had spent over a year in the
region, were totally unaware that such a route even existed. 98 The
journey to the fort was perilous especially thanks to weather conditions that were the worst in Indian memory. 99 The attempt to trek
through the marshes and forests of Florida was already fraught with
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dangers, but doing so while the region was battered by a hurricane verged on insanity. According to Solfs de Meras, a participant
in this bold enterprise, the Spaniards had to blaze a narrow trail
across a dense wilderness. Along the way, many marshes, swollen
by pouring rain, slowed down their progress. 100 As the Chaplain in
St. Augustine later admitted: "According to the practice of those
Indians and by the signs they made, we understood that it was five
leagues to the fort of the enemies, but on the road it appeared
to be more than fifteen and a very bad road .... "101 The extreme
weather conditions had certainly contributed to lengthen the journey from two days, according to the initial estimate of indigenous
informants, to four. 102 As Menendez himself admitted: "On the
18 th of September we found the rivers greatly swollen with the
much rain that had fallen, so that we advanced but little until the
19 th at night, when we came to sleep a league more or less from the
Fort; then for more than 15 leagues, through morasses and desert
paths never yet trod, so as to be able to get round the streams .... "m
One can expect that the Spaniards could not have found their way
to the French outpost on such a meandering path without the assistance of indigenous guides who possessed an intimate knowledge
of tl1e region. Both Laudonniere and Le Moyne accused a "renegade Frenchman," Franc;:ois Jean, of leading the enemy to their
fort. 104 Solis de Meras, however, remarked that this individual was
only "acquainted with the country for two leagues around [tile
fort]. " 105 The numerous detours that the Spaniards had to take the
100
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day before the attack would have cancelled out any prior knowledge thatjean had acquired during his stay in Fort Caroline. In
fact, the captive was only able to provide useful geographic knowledge the very morning of the attack. 106 It is therefore clear that
his contribution was much less important than that ofMenendez's
native guides. No wonder De Mera described them as "Angels that
God was sending." 107
The Timucuas also controlled the flow of critical intelligence
regarding French and Spanish activities in the region. Le Challeux hinted at this phenomenon when he rermarked: "The Spaniards who had landed had enough time to spy on us and even to
learn the means to surprise us, being well informed that our forces
were at sea, and those left in the fort were either sick ... or craftmen, women, and children." 108 While the Huguenot carpenter
did not directly accuse the Timucuas of sharing this information
with the Spaniards, the natives had the means to do so. The two
Indian guides who left St. Augustine with Menendez's force on
September 16 "told them by signs," observed Solfs de Meras, "that
they had been at the French harbor 6 days before." 109 This means
that these two individuals would have been there on September
10, the day Ribault set sail for Seloy with most of tl1e fighting men
available. 110 Since the Huguenot leader had begun to embark his
troops two days earlier, these native visitors would have been in a
position to gather useful intelligence about Ribault's activities and
transmit this pertinent information to the Spaniards. While Le
Challeux's suspicions are very plausible, it is important to point
out, however, that none of the Spanish eye-witnesses corroborated
the carpenter's claim. In a letter addressed to Philip II on October 15, 1565, Menendez himself attributed his decision to strike
La Caroline to a learned guess: " . .. within two days," he wrote, "a
hurricane and terrible storm came upon them, and as it appeared
to me that they could not have returned to their fort and ran risk
of being lost, and that in order for them to come to attack me, as
they had done, they must bring a larger and better force than they
did, that their fort must have been left weak and now was the time
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to attack it."lll Such a scenario could explain why, right before the
storming of La Caroline, the adelantado sought to capture a sentinel
"in order to learn about their [the Huguenot garrison 's] strength
and the men they have." 112 It is surprising, however, that Menendez
would have passed up such a golden opportunity to learn about
his enemies. Did he doubt the sincerity of his guides? Did a language barrier prevent these two individuals from communicating
the information they had gathered since they could only do so by
signs? Did the adelantado omit to mention their contribution in an
effort to boost his image as a competent and insightful leader? Did
the guides confirm what he had suspected earlier, thus making it
unnecessary to credit them for this intelligence?
While it is difficult to gauge how much the Spaniards learned
from the Indians about the French outpost on the eve of the attack,
one can safely conclude that the French received very little intelligence from the natives concerning their rivals. Since Ribault's
return to Florida on August 28, many Indian chiefs who had previously shunned the Huguenots had resumed their visits to the fort
in what could have been interpreted as a diplomatic warming. 11 3
On August 30, for instance, a number of neighboring community leaders including "Emola, Saranay, Alicamany, Malica and Castz"
had paid a visit to Ribault_ll 4 Emola had also informed the French
on September 8 that the Spaniards were settling in Seloy. n 5 Yet,
the natives provided absolutely no forewarning about the punitive expedition that was meandering toward La Caroline. According to Le Challeux, the earliest information the French received
from the Timucuas about this threat was after the debacle. 11 6 The
inclement weather, which lasted until September 23 (three days
after the attack), could well have been responsible for the communication breakdown. Yet, one should not forget that, beneath the
appearances of a detente between the Huguenots and the Timucuas,
tensions remained. Despite the coming and going of neighboring chiefs in the French settlement after Ribault's return in late
August, Saturiwa, their overlord, remained aloof. The magnate
had begun to shun Laudonniere a year earlier after the latter had
111 Ware "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 426; Ruidiaz, La Florida, 85. See
also Solfs de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 49.
l 12 Solis de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 55, 56.
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114 Ibid., 171.
ll5 £bid. , 175.
116 Ibid., 214.
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threatened him at gun point. Until then, the indigenous leader
had been eager to participate in face-to-face meetings with his
counterpart. Incidentally, when Dominique de Gourgues returned
to La Florida in 1568 determined to avenge the Huguenot losses
by attacking San Mateo, La Caroline's successor, Saturiwa met him
promptly. 117 One can therefore conclude that indigenous visits to
Fort Caroline after August 1565 were only designed to assess the
strength ofRibault's contingent and lull the Huguenots into a false
sense of security. For their part, the French received meager information from the Indians who stopped by the fort. After meeting
with Chief Emola, Laudonniere was under the impression that the
Spaniards had taken Seloy by force, although Iberian sources prove
otherwise. 118 As DeCoster has points out: "The difference between
the representations may indicate an effort by Saturiwa to court both
the French and the Spanish receiving the Spaniards kindly but giving the French the impression that they had been resisted." 119 This
strategy would have allowed the indigenous leader to "hedge his
bets" had Menendez or Ribault come out victorious in this affair.
In the end, despite Menendez's fear that a number of chiefs would
come to the rescue of the French and ambush the Spanish strike
force on its way to the St. Johns River, no such attack took place. 120
Furthermore, no indigenous informant came forward to warn the
Huguenots of the looming threat. In 1568, the Timucuas resorted
to a similar tactic when they joined forces with De Gourgues to
boot the Spaniards out of the region. As had been the case three
years earlier, the Timucuas managed to keep the enemy garrison
unaware of the French presence and the fate that awaited them
until the very beginning of the attack. 121
Following the fall of La Caroline, the Timucuas drove the final
nail in the Huguenot coffin by providing critical intelligence
regarding the whereabouts of French survivors. "On the 23u, of
September [1565] ," wrote Menendez, "two Indians came to inform
me that there were many Frenchmen about six leagues from
here .... "122 This was a group of 140 men who had sailed with Rib117 Lussagnet, Les Franr,ais en Amerique, 189. There are numerous versions of this
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120
121
122

account. Two are available in Lussagnet, Les Franr,ais en Ambique, 241-251;
186-200. Paul Caffarel also published a more detailed version of the affair in
Histoire de laFloridefranr,aise (Paris: Pirmin-Didot, 1875), 483-515.
Lussagnet, Les Francais en Ambique, 175.
DeCoster, "Entangled Borderlands," 388.
Solis de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 52.
Caffarel, Histoire de la Floride franr,aise, 497, 502-3.
Ware, "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 427; Ruidiaz, La Florida, 87.
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ault to St. Augustine and who, caught in the hurricane, ended up
being shipwrecked. 123 Almost two weeks later, on October 10, Indians also reported the presence of 200 other survivors a few leagues
south of the Spanish outpost. 124 Stranded and defenseless, these
castaways were easy targets for Menendez, who swiftly put them
under the knife,just as he had done with the previous batch. The
widespread unwillingness of the Timucuas to protect the French
at a time when they were most vulnerable allowed Menendez to
destroy easily what could have become, with Native American assistance, threatening pockets of resistance. 125
Reports of Spanish provenance reveal that Native Americans
assumed, on occasions, a more active role in neutralizing other survivors by killing or capturing them directly following the obliteration of the French fleet. 126 Except for these discrete indigenous
attacks, it does not seem that the Timucua warriors were involved
in the storming of La Caroline, at least eye-witness accounts remain
totally silent about their participation in tl1e event. t 27 The fate
of Fort San Mateo in 1568 seems to confirm that Spanish soldiers
alone were responsible for the capture of the Huguenot outpost.
That year, a few hundred Timucuas accompanied De Gourgues'
soldiers on the battlefield. Few, if any, of the defenders managed to
escape because the Indians cut out all escape routes and intercepted those who tried to flee into the forest. 128 One could expect that
the Timucuas would have done likewise had they participated in
the attack on Fort Caroline. If this had been the case, it is unlikely
that some sixty fugitives, some wounded, would have been able to
slip into the woods and elude pursuit for several days. 129
123 Ware, "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 428; Ruidiaz, ed., La Florida, 88.
124 Ware, "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 488; Ruidiaz, La Florida, 102;
Solfs de Meras, "The Conquest of Florida," 69.
125 Hulton, The Works ofJacques Le Mayne de Morgues, 133, 138.
126 Ware, "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 428; Ruidiaz, La Florida, 88;
Mendoza Grajales,"Memoria de! buen su(usso," 15, 16
127 McGrath claims that "an indeterminate number of Timucuas" accompanied
Menendez's force. The French in Early Florida, 145.
128 Lussagnet, Les Fran(ais en Ameriqu.e, 194, 196, 247; Caffarel, Histoire de la Floride
Jranraise, 505, 507, 508.
129 Le Moyne, who had been wounded during a failed attempt to ransom Utina
for food, roamed in the woods for three days without ever reporting the presence of Native Americans. Hulton, Th.e Works ofJacques Le Moyne de Morgues,
134-5. After slipping out of La Caroline, Le Challeux even had time to stop a
short distance from the woods to see what was happening in the fort. Lussagnet, Les Francois en Amerique, 217. Laudonniere also reported that a number of
wounded colonists found refuge in the woods. Lussagnet, 180.
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Besides controlling the flow of critical intelligence, the
Timucuas also made it easier for Menendez to capture La Caroline
by contributing to the weakening of its infrastmcture. Laudonniere, in his account of the attack, mentioned that the Spaniards
entered the fort in three spots, including two breaches in the palisade.130 Interestingly, the assailants, who had brought twenty ladders to scale the fortifications, did not have to cut their way into the
outpost. 131 They had simply taken advantage of pre-existing gaps
in the wall. To understand this baffling turn of events, it is necessary to recall that, in the months preceding Ribault's return to La
Florida in 1565, French-Indian relations had deteriorated to such
an extent that by August the French finally decided to abandon
La Caroline. As Le Moyne put it, "it was decided for two reasons to
destroy our fort before our departure; firstly, lest it should be of
use to the Spaniards (who we knew wanted to come to that place)
after we had left, against the French if they should return; secondly,
so that Satouriwa should not take it over when it had been abandoned. We therefore destroyed it." 132 Ribault's sudden arrival in
late August,just as the colonists were about to sail back to France,
had given La Caroline a new lease on life. By the time, Ribault's
fleet headed south to attack Menendez, the fortifications had yet
to be fully completed. On September 12 or 13, fearing that the
hurricane had had the best of Ribault, Laudonniere redoubled
the efforts to patch up the defenses. But, convinced that a Spanish
assault could only come from the sea, the colonists mainly tried to
mend the fortifications facing in that direction. 133 Weather condi130 Lussagnet, Les Fran,ais en Amerique, 179, 180.
131 Ware, "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles," 426; Ruidiaz, La Flarida, 86.
132 Hulton, The Works ofJacques Le Mayne de Morgues, 131. Le Challeux confirmed
that the settlement had to be rebuilt (Lussagnet, Les Fraw,:ais en Amerique, 207).
Based on Laudonniere's account, it seems that the French settlers destroyed
the fort in two phases. The rather vague chronological details suggest that the
French first destroyed the houses located outside of tJ1e fort perimeter and
the palisade facing the river in the first half of August. While the decision to
weaken ilie outpost's defenses is rather cow1ter-intuitive, especially since the
French expected iliat a Spanish attack would most likely come from tJ1e side,
Laudonniere claims fuat his men acted of their 0W11 accord and fuat he was
unable to stop them (Lussagnet, 143,157,158). The second phase must have
taken place right before ilie residents embarked to return to France on August
28, 1565 -Le Cha lieux claims that it was on the 27- (Lussagnet, 164, 156,210).
Interestingly, Laudonniere's statements fuat he was in the fort when Ribault
landed on the river bank seem to contradict earlier claims tJrnt fue outpost had
been destroyed (Lussagnet, 166, 167). It is possible however iliat fue site still
had some defensive value despite the residents ' efforts to destroy it.
133 Lussagnet, Les Franrais en Amerique, 177.
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tions nonetheless forced Laudonniere to stop the repairs before
completion leaving breaches on the east and west sides of the
fort. 134 This was an opportunity that the attackers did not fail to
exploit. These structural weaknesses, compounded by the stealthiness of the operation, explain why the Spaniards were able to master the place so quickly.
In the end, Saturiwa and his Timucua allies scored a resounding victory over the Huguenots without having to commit significant resources and manpower. By providing Menendez with
logistical support, geographic information, and critical intelligence
about La Caroline, among others, the Timucuas gave the Spaniards
a significant advantage to annihilate the Protestant interlopers who
threatened their shipping lanes and challenged Philip II's claim to
La Florida. Unbeknownst to Saturiwa, the Timucua involvement in
this episode would put the history of colonial North America on a
totally new trajectory, redirecting Gallic imperial ambitions in the
higher latitudes of the continent and postponing for over a hundred years French implantation in the Southeast. Despite these
momentous repercussions, the indigenous contributions would
remain overlooked for centuries in great part because sources of
French provenance, such as Le Challeux's memoir, became the
most widely available documentary evidence about the affair. The
strong anti-Spanish biases of their authors contributed to relegate
the Native Americans in the oubliettes of history. 135 In that respect,
one may wonder if Laudonniere and his fellow colonists were not
"the greatest dissemblers in the world" after all.

134 Ibid., 179, 180.
135 McGrath, The French in Early Fwrida, 5--6.
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